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Korea’s Dynamic Economic Partnership with a Rising China:  





During the last 20 years, Korea and China have rebuilt their economic relations. Korea has 
benefited from China’s rise through vertical cooperation in the East Asian manufacturing network. The 
complementary nature of vertical cooperation has reduced direct competition or “threats” from China. 
However, after the global financial crisis of 2008, the foundation of Korea-China cooperation itself 
started to change. China now needs a new model of development, one that is less dependent on external 
markets and leads to a quicker industrial upgradation. China’s strategic shift will dismantle the 
current Korea-China bilateral economic relations. As China’s industrial supply chains become more 
value added, the former vertical cooperation between Korea and China will be transformed into a 
parallel competition. 
 





Two decades have passed since Korea resumed formal diplomatic ties with China in 1992. 
Bilateral economic relations between Korea and China have grown rapidly in terms of trade 
and investment volumes. In 2011, bilateral trade reached US$ 220.6 billion, while the 
accumulated total Korean Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in China exceeded US$ 49 billion. 
Each country has become a major economic partner for the other during these 20 years. 
Currently, China is Korea’s largest trade and investment partner, and Korea is China’s 3rd 
largest trade partner, following the U.S. and Japan.  
This impressive development in bilateral economic relation can be regarded as quite 
natural in some sense. Firstly, it has been a process of “compensating” for or “catching up” 
of economic relations, which had stalled for almost 100 years because of political reasons.  
During the latter half of this political separation, Korea transformed itself successfully 
into a major industrialized country and an active trader in the global economy. China also 
introduced “reform and opening” strategy in the late 1970s and gradually participated in 
international trade and investment. Thus, once the political barriers vanished between the 
two neighboring economies, the long-suppressed bilateral economic relations recovered very 
quickly, exactly as indicated by the gravity model.1  
Though the rapidly growing economic strength and geographic proximity can account for 
this growth in trade and investment between Korea and China, clearly these are not providing 
enough explanations for these developments (Sohn and Yoon, 2001). Notably, in today’s 
globalized economy, bilateral economic relations would have to be built on the basis of 
international division of labor and firm-level production network activities. As a result, these 
two aspects should be properly addressed while focusing on bilateral economic relations. The 
                                                          
1 The gravity model of trade predicts bilateral trade flows between two units based on their economic 
sizes and geographic proximity. The model was first used by Tinbergen in 1962.  
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broader contexts of the global shifts in manufacturing activities, the development of the 
Global Production Network (GPN), and the industrial division of labor in East Asia, —all of 
which have been stimulated by the integration of China into the global market—should be 
considered in order to understand the real nature of the development of bilateral economic 
relations. Indeed, in this context of globalized activities, Korea and China have been two of 
the most active players.  
At the same time, during these two decades, both Korea and China have experienced 
some of the most dynamic economic developments. In 1992, Korea had just completed 
establishing heavy industries with its “government-led” investment approach. The East Asian 
economic crisis in the late 90s challenged the effectiveness of this model. Korea experienced 
a severe and painful process of economic restructuring during the crisis. However, owing to 
its drastic and painful restructuring in 2000, today, Korea is regarded one of the world’s 
highly advanced, knowledge-based economies. Korea has successfully established several 
global leading industries such as semiconductor and display manufacturing, information 
technology, steel, shipbuilding, and automobiles.  
In that same year (1992), China resumed its reforms in the aftermath of the Tiananmen 
incident. In January 1992, Deng Xiaoping made the famous “southern tour” and the 
Communist Party of China officially declared the “Socialist Market Economy” as the 
country’s new national strategy. Since then, China has transformed herself into an active 
market economy, eventually becoming the biggest exporter and the second largest economy 
in the world. The economic emergence of China makes her one of the world’s major growth 
engines. In fact, after the 2008 economic crisis, China is widely regarded as having stepped 
into the shoes of the old growth engines, the U.S. and the EU. Currently, China seems to be a 
serious contender in the “G2” for the leadership of the global economy in the post-crisis 
economic terrain2 (Garrett, 2009:3). 
Thus, the dynamic economic developments of these two countries should also be taken 
into consideration while studying the evolution of bilateral economic relations between them. 
 
 
2. ASSESSMENT OF OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS 
 
Bilateral economic relations can be portrayed with quantitative terms like trade volume, 
investment flow, personnel exchange, etc. However, to understand the relationship from the 
Korean perspective, the terms “opportunity” and “threat” are quite useful. In this context, let 
us consider the economic rise of China and its implications for the rest of world, as has been 
widely accepted (Huang, 2012; Jee et al., 2005:26-33).3 We therefore use this “opportunity 
and threat” approach as a starting point of our description of the bilateral relations between 
Korea and China.4 
In this regard, for instance, the rapid growth of the Chinese import market and the 
                                                          
2 A typical response of one Chinese scholar on China’s role in the world economy can be seen in Yu 
(2004), although the study was published long before the crisis.  
3  The title of a seminar held by a Korean institute (Research Institute of International Issues; 
Kukjemunjezhosayeonguso) was “Rising China’s Economy: opportunity or threat?” in 2001.  
4 This approach is also very realistic as bilateral relations between the two countries are asymmetric. 
The economic influences, or the weightage of the relation for each economy, are different; while 
China is Korea’s biggest economic partner, Korea is not so for China. 




continuing Korean trade surplus could be regarded as a huge economic opportunity, which 
Korea enjoys in this bilateral economic relationship. On the contrary, the industrial catch up 
of China’s enterprises has often been interpreted as an economic threat for Korean industries. 
Furthermore, as many Korean companies invest in China, the Korean public has been 
concerned about the “hollowing out” of Korean manufacturing and lost domestic job 
opportunities. 
However, this prevailing “opportunity and threat” approach easily deteriorates into an 
excessively simple mercantilist perception of bilateral economic relations between these 
countries. Surely, today’s mainstream economist recognizes this perception as being far from 
reality. Consequently, we can try to enrich our understanding within the wider context of 
globalization and dynamic economic development of both countries, by considering trade 
balance and industrial competition.  
 
2.1. Trade Opportunities  
 
Trade and the investment are the two arms of any bilateral economic cooperation. There 
are two apparent features in the Korea-China trade: the rapid growth of overall trade volume, 
and the continuing and expanding trade imbalance.  
Compared to a mere US$ 6.4 billion in 1992, the Korea-China mutual trade volume 
rocketed by 34.6 times to reach US$ 220.6 billion in 2011. Korea’s overall foreign trade 
increased by 6.8 times for the same period. During this time, Korea’s export to China 
increased 50.6 times from US$ 2.6 billion to US$ 134.1 billion. With this bilateral trade, 
Korea has enjoyed a trade surplus since 1993, for 19 years in a row. In 2011, the trade 
surplus touched US$ 47.7 billion or 21.6% of bilateral trade (see figure 1). 
For Korea, the trade surplus with China contributed significantly towards maintaining its 
overall trade surplus and helped Korea to cope in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 
1997-1998. This is quite clear when we compare the accumulated total of Korea’s trade 
surplus with China (US$ 272 billion) with that of all over the world (US$ 239 billion) for the 
period of 1992-2011. It means, if the trade with China is excluded, that Korea actually  
 
















Source: kita.net  
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records a trade deficit with the rest of the world during the two decades in question. For this 
reason, many Koreans regard the Korea-China bilateral trade as a real blessing for the 
Korean economy. The widely accepted notion of “Chinese opportunity” or “Chinese boom” 
might well come from this background in trade. 
The question arises as to how this has come to be. How can we explain these huge 
benefits from Korea’s trade with China? The factors of the gravity theory, the geographic 
proximity, and the sizes of the economies reveal only a superficial part of the whole story.  
The unique historical paths of Korea’s economic development and Chinese reform can 
provide deeper explanations. The globalized nature of bilateral relations also gives us an 
opportunity to sketch the real story.  
Let us return to 1992, the year when diplomatic ties were established between Korea and 
China. It was an ideal “match” at the outset. At that point, Korea had just completed 
industrial upgradation, which had started in the late 70s under the-then President Park’s 
initiative. By then, capital-intensive, heavy, chemical industries like steel, petrochemical, 
automobiles, electronics, and semiconductors, had become the mainstays of Korean industry. 
The ratio of heavy industry in the Korea’s manufacturing exports rose dramatically from 
38.3% in 1977 to 65.6% in 1992, and to 93.7% in 2011 (Byeon, 1990:535; www.stat.kita.net).  
Given the fact that heavy industries require heavy input of capital in order to mass 
produce, Korean industries were desperately looking for new export markets for their 
products after the end of the “three-low boom” in late 80s.5 The normalizing of diplomatic 
ties between the countries and the opening up of the Chinese market in 1992 provided a 
golden opportunity. 
As mentioned earlier, 1992 was a turning point for China as well. Under Deng’s initiative 
of the Socialist Market Economy, China toned down her ideological reservations and started 
to open up her economy. With this breakthrough, China’s cheap labor power and abundant 
land absorbed foreign investors. FDI inflow more than doubled from US$ 4.4 billion in 1991 
to US$ 11.0 billion in 1992. It reached US$ 37.5 billion just after 3 years (1995). Thus, 
during 1990-1995, FDI inflow increased more than 10 times (see table 1). 
It was the emergence of the East Asian production network that transformed Chinese 
coastal areas into the final assembling platforms for global companies. After 1992, foreign 
joint ventures (JVs) from all over the world poured into these areas. They utilized China’s 
cheap labor and land, and produced labor-intensive products like garments, toys, shoes, 
computer sets, among others for global export. Since then, China’s export has almost 
doubled every five years.6 
 
Table 1. China’s FDI Inflow during 1990-1995 
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
FDI inflow 
(billion, US$) 
3.5 4.4 11.0 27.5 33.7 37.5 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1996  
                                                          
5 During 1986-1988, a combination of low oil prices, low interest rates, and a low currency value 
helped Korean industries experience an unprecedented rate of growth in exports and this led to an 
economic boom. The excessive industrial capacity built in the late 70s under the-then President Park’s 
strong “guidance” finally found its market. 
6 China’s recorded exports were worth US$ 71.9 billion in 1991, US$ 266.1 billion in 2001, and US$ 
1,898.6 billion in 2011. China Statistical Yearbook. 




These foreign exporters with labor-intensive assembling needed equipment, machinery, 
materials, parts, and components for their production in China. However, China’s upstream 
industries could not meet the demands of the foreign JVs. At the time, China’s upstream 
industries consisted of “State-Owned” Enterprises focusing on the conventional domestic 
market. Their poor governance seldom responded adequately to the dramatic shifts in the 
GPN activity of the multinationals located in China. 
Thus, the fast-growing export industries driven by FDI and the GPN activity of 
multinationals needed other sources to procure the capital and intermediary goods needed for 
production. At the time, highly industrialized Korea, Japan, and Taiwan were the obvious 
ideal partners for them. They were ready and capable to provide any goods that China 
needed. Most of all, they were located very close, just across the sea.  
As a result, along with its fast-growing exports to the world market, China’s imports have 
also increased very rapidly since 1992. The annual growth rate of 8.6% during 1986-1991 
accelerated to 12.0% during 1992-1997, and 17.0% during 1992-2011. The majority of 
imports consisted of capital and intermediary goods from its industrialized East Asian 
partners, Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. This completed the East Asian production network.  
When we look at the composition of Korean exports to China, the structure is quite 
evident: 95% of Korean exports consist of capital goods (24.6%, 2008) including equipment 
and machinery, and intermediary goods including parts and components (69.9%, 2008) (See 
Figure 2). 
A major proportion of Korean exports are to China. The Chinese Customs Office 
categorizes around 70% of Korean exports as “processing and bonded trade,” which is 
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Source: Lee et al.(2011:47). 
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finally employed in China’s export sectors. Only 30% is categorized as “general trade,” 
which attracts custom duties (See Figure 3). 
 
2.2. Threats: Competition and Hollowing out 
 
As China became the workshop of the world, its global market share expanded rapidly 
from 1.8% in 1990 to 9.6% in 2011. Today, China exports more high tech items. According 
to OECD standards, only 27.4% of China’s export was classified as “high or middle tech” in 
1992. However, the number grew to 56.3% in 2006 (Bank of Korea 2007:15). This means 
that Korean exporters face more competition with China in the international market as time 
goes.  
Being an export-oriented economy, it seems natural for Korean industry and businesses 
to feel threatened by the unprecedented scale and scope of China’s rising presence in the 
global market. Moreover, this concern has been quite prevalent in Korea from the late 1990s. 
At times, the situation has been depicted with terms like “sandwich” or “nut cracker” to 
show how the Korean economy is pressurized on the one hand by China and on the other by 
the prevailing advanced knowledge-based economies like Japan, the U.S., and Europe. The 
traditional economic nationalism of Korea also drives this concern.  
However, if we take into account the transfer of certain GPN activities by multinationals 
(namely, their export platform) to China, we discover an alternative story about the nature of 
competition and “threat” faced by Korean industries and companies in international market. 
Most of all, foreign JVs in China are responsible for more than half of China’s exports, 
which peaked at 58.3% in 2005. The ratio continued to remain higher than 50% in 2011. 
Among the foreign JVs, Korean JVs played a significant role. For example, in 2005, 10 
Korean JVs were listed among the top 100 exporters of China. In this regard, around half of 
the competition with Chinese products in the global market actually came from those 
multinationals, including Korean companies, which have already invested in China and built 
an export platform there. Of course, this should not lead us to underestimate the growth of 
Chinese local exporters who claim another half of China’s exports and the importance of 
competition comes from those local players. However, the role of foreign JVs are still more 
crucial and dominant in the more high-tech export industries like IT and computers, where 
Korean and Chinese products are competing more strongly and directly in the global market.     
This alternative story thus provides a different perception of the competition faced by 
Korean companies. In some sense, China has not been competing against Korean industries. 
Rather, China has been a playing field or an industrial park where multinationals have 
invested and competed against each other. Thus, the major competition for Korean industries 
is not with its Chinese counterparts in the global output market. On the contrary, the 
competition exists in the input market among the multinationals that hope to make the most 
of China’s low-cost inputs like labor, land, and networks within China.  
There is another concern, too. As many Korean manufacturers offshored their production 
to China following the global shift of production networks, the worry of “hollowing out” 
rose among the Korean public. Increasing offshoring could undermine the basis of Korean 
manufacturing and reduce jobs in Korea.  
After the restoration of diplomatic ties in 1992, Korean FDI in China increased rapidly. 
By the end of 2011, a total of 21,743 Korean JVs were established in China, with 
investments of US$ 35.9 billion. At its peak in 2007, 2,116 investments amounting to US$ 
5.3 billion had been made in China (See Figure 4). 



















Source: www.koreaexim.go.kr  
 
 
It has been estimated that the number of Korean manufacturing jobs declined by 880 
thousand during 1990-2003, while Korean JVs in China hired 1 million Chinese workers 
(The Korea Economic Daily, 2004). A more solid econometric estimation reveals that Korea 
lost 134 thousand jobs during 1993-2003, with a loss of 44.6 thousand in 2003 alone. Korean 
domestic investment also decreased owing to rising Korean FDI in China (Park, 2005:75-76). 
However, several assessments disprove the hollowing out hypothesis. First, outward 
investment from a fast-growing economy like Korea can be regarded a quite usual response 
for a country coping with rising domestic costs and in need of industrial upgrading. Such 
countries tend to offshore labor-intensive export industries to other developing countries (in 
this case, China). Their more capital-intensive industries also seek offshoring to advanced 
countries, in order to secure the market (Lee, 1994). In line with this explanation, not only 
Korean FDI in China, but also the overall Korean FDI started to rise since the early 90s. FDI 
in China was just part of the overall trend for Korean industries at that time (Jee et al., 2004: 
129-142). also pointed out that FDI in China had provided gradual and graceful exits for 
some Korean companies whose business life cycles had run out of steam or in the declining 
stage. These events actually helped Korean industry as a whole by forcing inevitable 
restructuring and upgrading. 
The other point concerns job creation. With 21,743 Korean FDI projects in China by 
2011, Korean companies have actually created more than 100 thousand job opportunities for 
Korean staff working in China as well as for unskilled Chinese labor.7 Moreover, the jobs 
created for Korean staffs are non-menial, for example, managers and technical consultants. 
Currently, the Korean population in China numbers 700 thousand, with the majority working 
for Korean JVs or running their own business in China (Korean Embassy in Beijing, 2012). 
To summarize, contrary to public perception, the “threats” of competition in the products 
market or the loss of jobs owing to Korean FDI in China have not really threatened the 
Korean economy. When we consider the transfer of certain GPN activities by multinationals 
                                                          
7 A survey done by Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) in 2007 revealed that the 
average number of Korean staff employed per project was about 5. 
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to what is now known as the “workshop of the world” and the development of the Korean 
economy by the 1990s, we begin to appreciate other aspects. The competitions among 
multinationals to utilize China’s low-cost inputs were real competitions we have faced. The 




3. FROM THE WORKSHOP TO A MARKET: NEW CHALLENGES 
 
However, after the global financial crisis of 2008, the foundation of Korea-China 
cooperation itself started to change. Market demand from the U.S. and the EU decreased 
after the crisis and is likely to take quite a while to recover. This has seriously shrunk the 
final market for Chinese exports. The U.S. and the EU with their lingering economies can no 
longer provide a large enough market for the East Asian workshop. Under this new post-
crisis climate, China needs to transform itself from a workshop for the GPN activities of 
multinationals to a market for huge domestic consumers. The foundation of China’s export-
oriented development strategy needs a thorough reexamination, as does the Korea-China 
bilateral economic relations model, both of which have largely depended on the “workshop 
of the world.” 
As many economists have pointed out, China now needs a new model of development, 
which is less dependent on external markets. Decades of China’s “export-led growth formula 
must give way to the internal impetus consumer-led growth” (Roach, 2009:247). In China’s 
11th and 12th five-year plans started in 2006 and 2011, respectively, the Chinese government 
declared its intention to embark on a new road to secure China’s long-term growth, with the 
12th five-year plan outlining how this goal will be implemented. The plan identifies structural 
problems in the Chinese economy such as 1) the unsustainability of export-led growth, and 
2) the fact that consumption as a share of the GDP is too low on account of the low income-
to-GDP ratio, weak demand, and an unsustainably high savings rate (Casey and Koleski, 
2011:3). Once this transformation is implemented, China will become more domestic-
market-oriented rather than export-oriented. Additionally, labor income will take precedence 
over corporate profits, and consumption will rise while investments are likely to decrease.  
China’s strategic shift will dismantle the current Korea-China bilateral economic 
relations, as they were established on the basis of the GPN activities of multinationals and 
China’s export-led growth strategy. Just as China transforms her development pattern, 
Korea-China bilateral economic relations will face serious challenges to adapt to it. In that 
sense, the implications of this shift on Korea-China bilateral economic relations should be 
addressed carefully.  
As the opportunity-threat structures between Korea and China for the last 20 years have 
come about as a result of developments in East Asia’s manufacturing workshop, the nature of 
opportunities and threats posed by China will also change fundamentally. 
On the demand side, future opportunities exist for Korean industries in China’s domestic 
market rather than the provision of intermediary goods for export industries. Thus, in order 
to maximize the economic benefit from China’s transformation, Korea needs to penetrate 
directly into China’s domestic market. However, it is not doing well in this regard, as 
indicated by China’s imports.  
 
 




Table 2. The Ratio of General Trade within Imports from Various Countries 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Change from 2006-2010 
Korea 29.8 29.1 31.4 33.7 32.7 2.9 
Germany 65.7 68.4 67.8 74.5 77.9 12.2 
U.S. 47.8 51.8 57.7 64.8 62.5 14.7 
Japan 36.5 37.7 41.3 47.9 50.6 14.1 
Source: Calculated from (Lee et al., 2011:47)  
 
 
In 2010, the ratio of “general trade”8 in Korea was very low (at around 30%), while the 
corresponding figure for advanced economies like Germany (77.9%), the U.S. (62.5%), and 
Japan (50.6%) were much higher. It means that unlike Korea, they are better equipped to 
cope with China’s coming transformation and will thus be the biggest beneficiaries of 
China’s strategic shift (See Table 2). 
The changes in general trade during 2006-2010 show quite different performances 
between Korea and other competitors in China’s domestic market. The ratios of Germany, 
the U.S., and Japan rose by 12-14% while that of Korea rose only by 2.9% throughout the 
period (the crisis and the transformation). Korea’s advanced rivals are doing much better at 
adapting to the changes in the business climate of China’s domestic market.  
While much attention has been paid to the changes and challenges on the demand side, 
more fundamental changes will occur on the supply side. The changes on the demand side 
are correlated with those on the supply side. For instance, as the 12th five-year plan depicts, 
increased domestic consumption will require more disposable income. Higher incomes imply 
the need for higher wages, and higher wages will require larger business margins. Larger 
margins demand more mature value chains in Chinese industries. To meet the transformation 
on the demand side, China’s manufacturing needs to be upgraded to allow her to move up the 
value chain in light of rising labor costs. This interaction between the demand and the supply 
sides has been duly recognized and addressed in China’s 12th five-year plan (Casey and 
Koleski, 2011:3).  
Owing to the changes on the supply side, Korean JVs operating within China will first 
experience a direct shock in terms of rising costs. Small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) 
in labor-intensive industries would be hit first.9 Because they operate on very thin margins, 
many would be forced to shut shop in China or move to another country where the wages are 
still low. 
However, more fundamental threats will come from China’s industrial upgrade. While 
Chinese industries performed low value-added activities like processing and assembling, 
China depended on imported machinery, equipment, materials, parts, and components. This 
was a blessing rather than a threat for the other industrialized East Asian countries, including 
Korea.  
                                                          
8 It is the ratio of import with the final destination being the Chinese domestic market. This kind of 
import pays the tariff. 
9 In 2007, such a “shock” caused numerous cases of “flight by night” or “illegal” bankruptcy among the 
Korean JVs in Shandong province. They closed the factory leaving the wages and taxes unpaid. Most 
of the affected companies were SMEs in labor-intensive industries like simple processing or 
assembling (KIEP, 2008:22-27). 
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However, once China establishes high value-added and more capital-intensive industries, 
and builds a value chain inside the country itself, Chinese industries will start producing the 
capital as well as intermediary goods needed by China’s export sector. This will result in 
rapid import substitution and export upgradation.  
For any developing economy, including China, industrial upgradation is a natural process 
of economic development. Industrial upgradation has been an aspiration of the Chinese 
government since the early 1990s. Earlier, China’s 8th five-year plan (1991-1995) outlined 
various versions of government-led industrial policies to upgrade its capital-intensive heavy 
industries (or the so-called “pillar industries” such as automobiles, petrochemicals, 
machinery, electronics, etc. (Hong et al., 2002:85-87).  
However, this time, it is quite different, because for the first time, industrial upgradation 
has been integrated with China’s overall development strategy. Before the 12th five-year plan 
was devised, it was just a direction that any ambitious government with development 
aspirations would have taken. Now, it has become a precondition for future development. 
Under the new framework of economic development, which puts more emphasis on domestic 
consumption and the rapid rise of disposable income, Chinese companies would be 
pressurized to provide higher payrolls. 10  To enable higher payments, they will have to 
accelerate product upgradation and improve production processes. They would thus need to 
transform themselves into more capital-intensive, value-added, and high-tech companies. 
Moreover, this push no longer comes from the government’s policy but from the market 
environment itself.  
These changes are already underway. Chinese companies are getting bigger,11 and more 
capital- and technology-intensive.12 The R&D expenditure of the government and industries 
has been rising sharply.13 Chinese companies are acquiring reputed brands and technology 
through aggressive M&As.14  
These recent developments on the supply side triggered by the transformation of China’s 
development strategy mean two things. First, China’s industrial progress is bound to 
accelerate as the overall market environment encourages upgrading. Second, there will be 
strong competition between Korean and Chinese industries in the domestic Chinese and 
global markets. As China’s industrial supply chains become more value added, the former 
vertical cooperation between Korea and China will be transformed into a parallel 
competition. 
 
                                                          
10 Since 2010, the minimum wage levels have been rising by more than 10% every year in the almost 
every region in China. In reality, these levels are regarded as the wage guideline for companies in the 
respective regions.  
11 There were only 3 Chinese companies included in the “Fortune Global 500” list in 1995. The number 
climbed to 61 in 2011. For Korean companies, the corresponding numbers are 8 and 14, respectively. 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/  
12 The growth rate of heavy industries has continuously exceeded that of light industries.  
13 The key indicators of China’s 12th five-year plan include raising R&D spending from 1.75% to 2.2% 
of GDP (Proposal for Formulating the 12th five-year plan, 28 October 2010). 
14 The ODI of Chinese companies has increased rapidly. While China’s ODI was a mere US$ 2.7 
billion in 2002, it jumped to US$ 68 billion in 2010. In fact, China climbed up the world rankings to 
become the fifth-largest ODI investor in 2010. (UNCTAD, 2011:9; Ministry of Commerce of PRC, 
“Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment.”)  





4. BUILDING A NEW FORM OF COOPERATION 
 
During the last 20 years, Korea and China have rebuilt their political and economic 
relations. Korea has benefited from China’s rising through vertical cooperation between the 
GPN and the East Asian manufacturing network. So far, the complementary nature of 
vertical cooperation has dominated this relationship, where globalization enabled the 
conditions for economic co-development, and reduced direct competition or “threats” from 
China. At the same time, vigorous dynamics of both economies made the Korea-China 
bilateral economic relations a win-win situation. 
After 20 years of this “honeymoon,” the transformation of a rising China poses a serious 
challenge to these relations. Now, Korea finds itself losing out on China’s fast growing 
domestic market compared with other countries like Germany, the U.S., and Japan. On the 
supply side, the competition from China’s industrial upgradation has materialized at last.  
Being neighbors with a rising China, Korea should accommodate these new changes, just 
as it has done over the past 20 years. As to the changes on the demand side of the bilateral 
relations, the ongoing Korea-China FTA negotiation15 can help improve Korea’s accessibility 
to China’s domestic market. Moreover, capitalizing on the large bilingual population in both 
countries would present numerous business opportunities in China’s growing service sector, 
which is the mainstay of its domestic market.  
On the supply side, Korea needs to adopt the double strategy of participation and 
differentiation. On the one hand, Korean companies should be players and partners in 
China’s industrial upgradation, just like they were during China’s export-led industrialization. 
At that time, Korean SMEs and chaebols became one of the major stakeholders in China’s 
export industries through active FDI in those sectors. In the new phase of China’s industrial 
transformation, a similar strategy can help Korea maintain economic links with China’s “2nd” 
rising. If Korean companies can participate in the next phase of China’s industrial 
upgradation and become one of the major players of that phase, the risk of “Chinese threats” 
can be minimized. 
On the other hand, Korea’s domestic industries should also differentiate themselves from 
Chinese industries undergoing upgradation. Korean industries could do this effectively by 
dissecting their business activities more deeply. Even within an industry, the modern value 
chain approach provides a lot of spheres like R&D, design, craftsmanship, marketing, 
branding, financing, procurement, etc., where a company can find its niche by devising its 
own competitive edge and differentiating itself. 
The development of Korea-China bilateral economic relations demands more creativity 
from each party. After 20 years of successful cooperation, the future of their partnership 
depends on this creativity.  
 





                                                          
15 In May 2012, Korea and China announced the start of bilateral FTA negotiations. The 3rd round of 
negotiations was held in August 2012. 
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